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One inﬂuential account asserts that the anterior temporal lobe
(ATL) is a domain-general hub for semantic memory. Other evidence
indicates it is part of a domain-speciﬁc social cognition system.
Arbitrating these accounts using functional magnetic resonance
imaging has previously been difﬁcult because of magnetic
susceptibility artifacts in the region. The present study used
parameters optimized for imaging the ATL, and had subjects encode
facts about unfamiliar people, buildings, and hammers. Using both
conjunction and region of interest analyses, person-selective
responses were observed in both the left and right ATL. Neither
building-selective, hammer-selective nor domain-general responses
were observed in the ATLs, although they were observed in other
brain regions. These ﬁndings were supported by ‘‘resting-state’’
functional connectivity analyses using independent datasets from
the same subjects. Person-selective ATL clusters were functionally
connected with the brain’s wider social cognition network. Rather
than serving as a domain-general semantic hub, the ATLs work in
unison with the social cognition system to support learning facts
about others.
Keywords: anterior temporal lobe, domain-general, functional connectivity,
person knowledge, semantic hub
Introduction
It is now generally accepted that the representation of
knowledge in the human brain depends on broadly distributed
neural circuits that are differentiated by conceptual categories
and their associated perceptual, motor, and affective properties
(Martin 2007; Patterson et al. 2007; Barsalou 2008). At least 2
important questions remain unresolved, however. The ﬁrst is
whether a property-based model of the conceptual system is
sufﬁcient to support all conceptual phenomena (see Barsalou
1999 for a discussion of these issues). The second pertains to
the systemic architecture linking these property regions.
Recently, semantic hub models have grown in inﬂuence by
offering answers to both of these questions (Rogers et al. 2004;
Patterson et al. 2007). With regard to the ﬁrst, these models
assert that property circuits are necessary, but not sufﬁcient to
support conceptual knowledge; that in addition to property
regions one must posit the presence of an amodal, domain-
general representational hub. With regard to the second
question, these models assert that the anterior temporal lobe
is the domain-general hub through which property regions are
connected.
The anterior temporal lobes are regarded as the likely
location of the semantic hub, largely on the basis of evidence
from semantic dementia patients. Semantic dementia, a variant
of frontotemporal dementia, is a progressive degenerative
disorder characterized by damage to the anterior temporal
lobes in its earliest stages, followed by widespread deteriora-
tion in more posterior temporal and frontal cortices (Hodges
and Patterson 2007). Semantic dementia patients typically
exhibit impaired performance on a variety of semantic memory
tests across multiple categories of knowledge, whereas other
cognitive abilities remain relatively intact (Hodges et al. 1995;
Bozeat et al. 2000; Rogers et al. 2004). Recent studies have
shown that deﬁcits in semantic dementia are more highly
correlated with pathology along the lateral surface of the
anterior temporal lobes, as compared with more medial
temporal cortex (Mummery et al. 2000; Levy et al. 2004; Moss
et al. 2005).
Upon closer review, however, the neuropsychological
evidence for an anterior temporal hub is not so clear as it
might ﬁrst appear. First, the pathology in semantic dementia is
not restricted to the anterior temporal lobes. The pathology
often extends up into frontal cortex (Hodges and Patterson
2007; Brambati et al. 2009). In addition, voxel-based morphom-
etry demonstrates that semantic memory impairments in
semantic dementia patients are as strongly correlated with
pathology in the posterior fusiform as to pathology in the
anterior temporal lobe (Williams et al. 2005). Second, resection
of the temporal lobes to treat intractable epilepsy does not lead
to the catastrophic, domain-general semantic memory deﬁcits
one might predict if this region is the seat of conceptual
knowledge (Drane et al. 2008). Proponents of an anterior
temporal hub argue that this simply reﬂects the fact that the
surgery removes abnormal tissue that no longer serves its
normal function due to pathology-related reorganization.
Although this is undoubtedly true (Yucus and Tranel 2007), it
is not, however, as if the surgery or damage to this region is
without cognitive consequences. Anterior temporal resection,
or damage due to conditions such as herpes encephalitis, is
often associated with signiﬁcant episodic memory deﬁcits, as
well as notable domain-speciﬁc semantic impairments typically
including recognizing and naming famous and familiar people
(Damasio et al. 1990; McCarthy and Warrington 1992; Sergent
and Signoret 1992; Fukatsu et al. 1999; Tippett et al. 2000;
Barton et al. 2001, 2004; Glosser et al. 2003; Tsukiura et al.
2003). These ﬁndings suggest that the anterior temporal lobes
support person-speciﬁc knowledge, with the left hemisphere
being relatively more important for person naming.
Given its prominent role in semantic hub models, one would
expect a veritable mountain of neuroimaging evidence that the
anterior temporal lobes are involved in conceptual processing.
Signiﬁcantly, the majority of imaging studies, whether using
positron emission tomography (PET) or functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), have not observed anterior temporal
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posterior temporal or frontal cortex activations (see Thompson-
Schill 2003; Martin 2007). To the extent that anterior temporal
activation is observed during conceptual processing, it is usually
in the context of social conceptual processing tasks (Zahn et al.
2007, forthcoming; for review see Olson et al. 2007) along with
the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC), the posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS), the amygdala, and the precuneus;
regions that are widely regarded as the brain’s social cognition
network (Frith 2007). For example, the anterior temporal lobe is
frequently activated by theory of mind tasks (Olson et al. 2007),
as well as to famous and familiar faces (Sergent and Signoret
1992; Gorno-Tempini et al. 1998; Leveroni et al. 2000; Nakamura
et al. 2000; Grabowski et al. 2001; Sugiura et al. 2001; Damasio
et al. 2004; Pourtois et al. 2005; Rotshtein et al. 2005). The
ﬁndings of Tsukiura et al. (2008) are of particular interest to the
present study as they used a verbal fact recall task and observed
that activity in the left anterior temporal lobe reﬂects recall of
associations between names and faces, whereas right anterior
temporal activity reﬂects recall of faces and person-related
semantic information.
Aside from the processing of social concepts, functional
neuroimaging evidence for anterior temporal lobe involve-
ment in conceptual processing has been inconsistent.
Although this would seem to be a major challenge to the
model, proponents of anterior temporal hub accounts cite 2
reasons for this dearth of evidence. First is the claim that fMRI
is blind to the anterior temporal lobes (Devlin et al. 2000,
2002). Relative to other brain regions, image quality in the
anterior temporal lobes is degraded due to distortions of the
magnetic ﬁeld caused by air--tissue interfaces. Hub proponents
have often addressed this problem by using PET imaging,
which does not suffer from the same signal deﬁcits, but with
spatial resolution that is 2 to 3 times lower than that of most
fMRI studies. Indeed, some PET studies have provided support
for anterior temporal hub accounts by demonstrating
anterior temporal activations during conceptual processing
(Vandenberghe et al. 1996; Devlin et al. 2000, 2002;
Vandenberghe et al. 2002; Crinion et al. 2003; Davis and
Johnsrude 2003; Rogers et al. 2006). Additionally, a parallel
literature has developed showing activation of the ATLs during
sentence-level processing using both reading and auditory--
verbal stimuli (Mazoyer et al. 1993; Dronkers et al. 1994, 2004;
Stowe et al. 1999; Friederici and Von Cramon 2000; Friederici
et al. 2000; Humphries et al. 2001, 2005; Meyer et al. 2003).
These studies often report that the ATL is activated for
syntactically correct versus incorrect sentences that control
for semantic content, thus indicating a potential role for the
ATLs in the representation of syntax.
A second argument put forth for why imaging studies of
conceptual processing often do not ﬁnd anterior temporal
activation is that they employ tasks that require subjects to
process concepts at a level that is too general to engage the
region, or because they compare categories at different levels
of speciﬁcity. By this account, the aforementioned person-
knowledge effects in the anterior temporal lobes do not reﬂect
social information processing per se, but rather the comparison
of speciﬁc classiﬁcation (e.g., famous faces) with more general
classiﬁcation (e.g., nonfamous faces, animals, tools) (Tyler et al.
2004; Rogers et al. 2006).
Hub accounts claim that the anterior temporal lobes are the
seat of human conceptual knowledge, storing amodal concep-
tual representations, irrespective of category. On the other
hand, a different account asserts that the anterior temporal
lobes are domain-speciﬁc and involved in the representation of
person knowledge. Based on the issues and controversies
described so far, directly testing these 2 accounts requires: 1)
an fMRI study with adequate signal quality in the anterior
temporal lobes; 2) processing of multiple object categories, at
least one of which is people; 3) each processed at the same
level of speciﬁcity; 4) with the same type of information across
categories; and 5) a nonconceptual control condition.
To meet these requirements, we used fMRI scan parameters
optimized for imaging the anterior temporal lobes to study
subjects while they learned facts about 4 different unfamil-
iar and unique people, places, and hammers, or performed
a nonconceptual control task, in this case a Riser Letter
Detection task. In the scanner, subjects were presented only
written sentences describing the age, location, and occupa-
tion/usage of the people, places, and hammers, ensuring that
all categories were processed at the same level of speciﬁcity
and with the same types of information (e.g., see Table 1). If
the anterior temporal lobes serve as a hub for domain-general
conceptual processing, then we should expect to ﬁnd anterior
temporal lobe regions that respond equally to all 3 categories
over and above the nonconceptual Riser Letter Detection Task
control condition. If on the other hand the anterior temporal
lobes are part of a domain-speciﬁc social information process-
ing network, then we should expect to ﬁnd anterior temporal
regions that exhibit reliably greater activation for person
information as compared with either building or hammer
information. Additionally, if the social information processing
account of the anterior temporal lobes is correct, then we
should also expect that any person-selective regions in the
anterior temporal lobes will exhibit reliable functional
connectivity with the previously well-described social-pro-
cessing circuit distributed throughout the brain. To test this
last prediction, subjects also underwent a low-level Vigilance
Task scan before performing the Fact Encoding Task scans.
During this scan, subjects simply pressed a button whenever
they saw a ﬁxation mark change color, which occurred
approximately once a minute. With this independent data set
we were able to evaluate the entrained ‘‘resting-state’’
functional connectivity of the anterior temporal lobes.
Table 1
Examples of stimuli
Stimulus presented in scanner
Hammer
Age the brooks hammer is eight years old
Location the sperry hammer was built in kansas city
Occupation/usage the carson hammer is used to shatter window glass
Person
Age william is sixty three years old
Location patrick was born in little rock
Occupation/usage alex works as an insurance agent
Building
Age the monroe building is 73 years old
Location the gilbert building is located in baton rouge
Occupation/usage the newport building is used for voter registration
Riser detection
acran bcr triol ske tpiin kwlto
Note: The stimuli used only lower-case letters so that they would be identical to those used in the
Riser Detection Task.
814 Person-Selectivity in the Anterior Temporal Lobes
d Simmons et al.Materials and Methods
Participants
Twelve right-handed, native English-speaking volunteers were paid for
their participation (7 females; age range, 20--32 years). All subjects
completed health questionnaires and none reported a history of head
injury or other neurological problems. In accordance with the National
Institutes of Health Institutional Review Board protocols, all subjects
read and signed informed consent documents.
Experimental Design
Subjects performed 3 tasks while undergoing fMRI. During the ﬁrst
functional scanning run, subjects performed a simple Vigilance Task. In
the subsequent 3 scanning runs, participants performed alternating
blocks of the Fact-Learning Task and the Riser Detection Task.
Person-Building-Hammer Fact-Learning Task
Subjects were instructed to remember facts described by short
sentences presented in black font against a white background. Each
sentence described a fact about 4 unique but novel persons, buildings,
or hammers, each labeled with a different proper name (see Table 1 for
example stimuli). For each unique exemplar, subjects learned an age,
location, and usage/occupation fact (e.g., ‘‘the gilbert building is forty-
ﬁve years old’’; ‘‘the gilbert building is located in baton rouge’’; ‘‘the
gilbert building is used for community meetings’’). Our decision to have
subjects learn the same attributes about the 3 different categories’
exemplars was motivated by our desire to have subjects process the 3
categories at the same level of speciﬁcity and using similar types of
information. We believe this is important because hub proponents have
claimed that greater item speciﬁcity leads to greater anterior temporal
lobe activation (Tyler et al. 2004; Rogers et al. 2006). In addition, the
stimulus sentences were balanced across categories for average
number of words and letters per sentence.
During the task instruction period prior to entering the scanner,
subjects were presented with photographs of each unique entity and
given its name but no other information. At the conclusion of the
instruction period, subjects were again shown the photographs and
asked to recall each exemplar’s name. Subjects who were unable to
recall the correct name upon seeing its photograph were given extra
time to study the photo and learn the corresponding name.
In the scanner, subjects only saw sentences; no pictures were
presented. In each 18-s Fact-Learning Task block, subjects read
sentences describing the 3 facts for a particular exemplar, each
presented for 6-seconds. The presentation orders of sentences
describing the individual exemplars were varied within and between
categories, and presentation orders of the age, location, and usage/
occupation facts were randomized within each block. Subjects were
shown the 3 facts about an exemplar once during each run and 3 times
over the course of the experiment.
After being removed from the scanner, subjects were asked to ﬁrst
recall the critical information for each fact learned while in the scanner.
They were presented with the same sentences they read in the scanner,
but with the critical fact replaced with a blank space (e.g., ‘‘the gilbert
building is located in _________’’). After completing the recall trials,
subjects were given a forced-choice recognition test for all facts.
Entrained ‘‘Resting-State’’/Vigilance Task
To evaluate functional connectivity, we chose to use a simple vigilance
task because it provides images of the brain’s functional connectivity in
a more constrained context than the typical ‘‘resting-state’’ scan,
whereas keeping the subjects’ information processing load to
a minimum. In the vigilance task subjects ﬁxated a cross in the center
of a grey background and pressed a button anytime the ﬁxation mark
changed colors (mean interchange duration = 60 s, range 30--90 s).
These data provided an independent data set for exploring the
functional connectivity of brain regions activated in the subsequent
Fact-Learning Task scanning runs.
Riser Detection Task
Riser Detection letter strings were constructed by scrambling the
letters used in the Fact-Learning Task, and contained the same number
of spaces as the text strings in the Fact-Learning Task. By doing so, we
controlled for the amounts of visual stimulation and visual scanning
between the 2 tasks. There were 13 Riser Detection blocks in each
scanning run. In each 18-s Riser Detection Task block subjects saw 3
letter strings, presented individually for 6 s in black font against a white
background. The subjects’ task was to count the number of ‘‘riser
letters’’ in nonword letter strings and press a button on a response box
held in the right hand if the total was an odd number. Subjects were
instructed that the letters b, d, f, h, k, l, and t are riser letters because
they each have some portion that rises up above the tops of most other
lower-case letters. This task is a modiﬁed version of the ‘‘feature
detection task’’ used by Price et al. (1996).
Imaging Details
Stimuli were back-projected onto a screen at the head of the scanner and
viewed by subjects via a mirror mounted on the head coil. Stimulus
presentation and response collection both during scanning and the recall
and recognition tests were controlled using Eprime (www.pstnet.com).
During the Vigilance Task scanning run, 140 echoplanar MR volumes
depicting blood oxygenation level dependant (BOLD) contrast were
collected with a 3T General Electric scanner. In each echoplanar image
(EPI) volume 42 contiguous 3-mm thick slices were collected in the
axial plane, ensuring whole-brain coverage (echo time [TE] = 27 ms,
repetition time [TR] = 3500 ms, ﬂip angle = 90, voxel size = 2.3 mm 3
2.3 mm 3 3 mm). The 3 Fact-Learning Task runs used the same volume
parameters, although 143 volumes were collected per run. High-
resolution structural images were collected as the ﬁrst and last scans
in each session (TE = 6m s ,T R= 25 ms, ﬂip angle = 15,v o x e ls i z e= 0.9
mm 3 0.9 mm 3 1.2 mm). A General Electric 8-channel send-receive
head coil was used for all functional and structural scanning runs, with
a SENSE factor of 2 used to minimize EPI distortions in anterior temporal
regions while also reducing gradient coil heating over the course of the
scan session. As demonstrated by measurements of temporal signal-to-
noise (the ratio of the average signal intensity to the signal standard
deviation), signal quality in the anterior temporal lobes was very good
(see Fig. 1).
Prior to statistical analyses, image preprocessing was conducted
using the AFNI software package (Cox 1996). The ﬁrst MP--RAGE
anatomical scan was coregistered to the second MP--RAGE, and the 2
were then averaged to produce a single high-quality anatomical image
of the subject’s brain. Next, each subject’s EPI volumes were
coregistered to the 130th volume of the ﬁnal EPI scanning run, and
smoothed in the axial plane with an isotropic 6-mm full width half max
Gaussian kernel. Following application of slice time correction, and
removal of the ﬁrst 3 volumes from each run, EPI signal intensity
measurements at each time point were normalized to reﬂect the
percent signal change from the voxel’s signal time course mean.
fMRI Statistical Analyses
Multiple regression was used to analyze the Fact-Learning Task data.
The regression model included one regressor for each of the 3 fact
categories (people, buildings, and hammers) with the Riser Detection
Task periods composing the signal baseline. The 3 task regressors were
constructed by convolving a box-car function with a width of 18-s
beginning at the onset of a condition’s blocks with a gamma-variate
function to adjust the predictor variable for the delay and shape of the
BOLD response. In addition, regressors of no interest were included to
account for each run’s signal mean, linear, quadratic, and cubic signal
trends, as well as 6 motion parameters (3 translations and 3 rotations).
Subjects’ beta maps for each condition were then transformed to
Talairach space, and resampled to a 2-mm isotropic resolution. Finally,
a repeated measures random effects ANOVA was used on the
aggregated group data to evaluate differences between conditions at
the population-level.
We used the conjunction analysis methods described by Nichols et al.
(2005) to identify regions where the activity patterns across conditions
conformed to domain-speciﬁc and domain-general response patterns. A
domain-speciﬁc response was deﬁned as a cluster of activity where
a particular condition exhibited reliably greater activity than each of
the other Fact-Learning Task conditions. For example, to qualify as
Cerebral Cortex April 2010, V 20 N 4 815a person-selective region, each voxel in a cluster of activity had to
satisfy 2 separate statistical tests: person > building AND person >
hammer. Because this conjunction assumes a particular directionality,
each of the individual tests were thresholded at P < 0.05 one-tailed
within the 3 regions of interest (ROIs) described below, and at P <
0.005 one-tailed outside the ROIs. As described by Nichols et al. (2005),
the conservative estimate of the probability of a conjunction is the P-
value associated with the minimum statistic among the conjoined tests,
which in this case is P < 0.05 one-tailed in the ROIs and P < 0.005 one-
tailed outside the ROIs. To implement corrections for multiple
comparisons at the P < 0.05 level, we used Monte Carlo simulations
implemented in AFNI’s AlphaSim to identify the required cluster-size
threshold, given the voxel-wise probability and the volume in the
statistical map (see below) separately for each of the tests in
a conjunction. Because the clusters of activity for each test in
a conjunction were corrected for multiple comparisons, and should
thus be regarded as reliable, so too can the intersections between the
clusters. Nevertheless, because it is possible that small areas of
intersection between clusters from different statistical tests could be
induced by spatial smoothing and resampling, we applied a small
cluster-size threshold of at least 10 voxels (deﬁned in the original
scanning resolution) on all areas of conjunction.
In contrast to the domain-speciﬁc clusters, domain-general clusters
were deﬁned as regions where responses for all 3 categories were
reliably greater than the Riser Detection Task, but where activity did not
differ between categories in the Fact-Learning Task. To this end, we used
conjunction analyses similar to those used to identify domain-speciﬁc
clusters. First we identiﬁed regions where each of the categories in the
Fact-Learning Task responded reliably above the Riser Detection Task
with a P-value of 0.05 one-tailed in the ROIs and P-value of 0.005 one-
tailed outside the ROIs, again with each test corrected separately for
multiple comparisons at the P < 0.05 level using cluster-size correction
(see below). Importantly, the conjunction probability for domain-general
clusters was equal to the conjunction probability of the domain-speciﬁc
clusters. Finally, to remove regions showing a bias toward a particular
category, a mask was applied to the data to remove all regions exhibiting
ad i f f e r e n c ew i t hP < 0.25 between any 2 categories in the Fact-Learning
Task. Again, as with the domain-speciﬁc regions, a cluster-size threshold
of at least 10 voxels was applied to all areas of conjunction to ameliorate
concerns that smoothing or resampling induced the observed domain-
general clusters.
There were 3 region of interest volumes used in the cluster-size
threshold calculations: the anterior temporal lobes, the posterior
middle temporal gyrus, and the parahippocampal gyrus. The anterior
temporal lobes were deﬁned as all areas in the temporal lobes anterior
to the limen insula (Insausti et al. 1998; located at approximately y = 3
in the left hemisphere and y = 5 in the right hemisphere of the AFNI
Talairach N27 atlas brain). This ROI included only temporal cortex, and
did not include any portion of the amygdala. Within the volume of this
region, deﬁned bilaterally, a cluster-size threshold for individual tests
among the conditions was determined to be at least 1056 mm
3 (132
resampled voxels sharing at least one edge). The posterior middle
temporal gyrus between y = –40 and y = –69 was selected as a ROI given
its association with tool processing (for review see Beauchamp and
Martin 2007). Within this region, the cluster-size threshold was
determined to be at least 1216 mm
3 (152 voxels sharing at least one
edge). The parahippocampal gyrus was also selected as a ROI given its
association with location representation (Epstein and Kanwisher 1998;
Figure 1. Temporal signal-to-noise ratio (TSNR) maps showing EPI image quality over the anterior temporal lobes. The color gradient indicates the TSNR of the smoothed EPI
time course data overlaid on the AFNI Talairach N27 atlas brain. TSNR was calculated by dividing the mean signal intensity at a voxel by the standard deviation of its signal time
course. The color map is thresholded at a TSNR of 40, with all areas in red indicating a TSNR of at least 200. Simulations indicate that a TSNR of 40 (indicated in the map by light
blue) is the minimum to reliably detect effects between conditions in fMRI data (Murphy et al. 2007). Note that virtually all of the anterior temporal lobes far exceed this
threshold, with many anterior temporal regions exceeding a TSNR of 200.
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determined to be at least 992 mm
3 (124 voxels sharing at least one
edge). Finally, outside these 3 ROIs, clusters of activity had to exceed
as i z et h r e s h o l dd e ﬁ n e db yt h ev o l u m eo ft h eb r a i nm i n u st h e
volumes of the 3 ROIs, rendering a cluster-size threshold of at least
848 mm
3 (106 voxels sharing at least one edge). (The cluster size
threshold for the regions outside the ROIs is smaller than the cluster
size threshold within the ROIs because the P-value threshold outside
the 3 ROIs is more stringent by an order of magnitude; P < 0.05 vs.
P < 0.005.)
Functional connectivity analyses were implemented on the subjects’
Vigilance Task scanning run, with seed voxels determined by the
highest average t-values across the statistical contrasts used in the
group conjunction analyses. The connectivity analyses proceeded in
the following manner. First, at the subject-level, multiple regression was
used to model the run’s signal mean, linear, quadratic, and cubic signal
trends, as well as 6 motion parameter regressors. In addition, the
average signal time course from the subject’s ventricles was included to
further account for global signal changes. The residual time course for
each voxel was then used in the subsequent analyses. Time course
residuals for the anterior temporal lobe seed voxels were then used as
predictors in separate regression analyses, to produce a map of the
correlations between each voxel in the brain and a given seed voxel.
These r-values were then converted to Z-values using Fisher’s r-to-Z
transformation. Next, the subjects’ Z-maps were included in a random
effects, one-sample t-test to identify voxels whose means differed from
zero with P < 0.0005. Finally, these statistical maps were corrected for
multiple comparisons at the P < 0.05 level by applying a cluster-size
threshold of at least 296 mm
3 (37 voxels sharing at least one edge). The
resulting maps show brain regions where activity across subjects was
reliably correlated with a seed-voxel’s time course while subjects
performed the Vigilance Task scanning run, a dataset that was
independent of the Fact Encoding Task scanning runs.
Results
Behavioral Results
Responses to color change events in the Vigilance Task were
quick and accurate (RT: M = 614 ms, SD = 159 ms; detection
accuracy: M = 70%, SD = 22%). In contrast, subjects found it
difﬁcult to provide responses on the Riser Detection Task
within the allotted time for each trial (RT: M = 4768 ms, SD =
130 ms; detection accuracy: M = 26%, SD = 13%, responses
occurring earlier than 2 standard deviations from the response
mean were ﬁltered out, as were responses occurring later than
the 6-second trial duration). The riser detection accuracy
scores reﬂect the fact that subjects had to perform the task
under signiﬁcant time constraints, rather than indicating that
they were performing the task poorly. The letter strings
presented to subjects were rather long because they were
constructed by scrambling the fact-learning sentences, and as
a result it was difﬁcult for subjects to provide responses before
the stimuli disappeared from the screen.
After scanning, subjects demonstrated good recall of the
information presented during the Fact-Learning Task (Person
fact recall: M = 72%, SD = 17%; Building: M = 63%, SD = 17%;
Hammer: M = 65%, SD = 21%). Although subjects recalled more
person facts than building facts, t(11) = 4.31, P < 0.005, person
and hammer fact recall were equivalent, t(11) = 1.13, P = 0.28,
as was recall of building and hammer facts, t(11) = 0.38, P =
0.71. As with recall, recognition performance was good for all
categories (Person fact recognition: M = 87%, SD = 17%;
Building: M = 77%, SD = 17%; Hammer: M = 74%, SD = 24%).
Although subjects recognized more person facts than hammer
facts, t(11) = 2.55, P < 0.05, person and building fact
recognition were not reliably different, t(11) = 1.88, P = 0.09,
nor were recognition of building and hammer facts, t(11) =
0.49, P = 0.63.
The Anterior Temporal Lobes are Engaged while
Acquiring Person Knowledge
Two lateral anterior temporal regions exhibited person-
selective responses (Fig. 2A, Table 2). The 2 clusters, located
bilaterally in homologous locations in the temporal pole and
superior temporal gyri, responded more during person-fact
encoding than during building-fact or hammer-fact encoding.
Aside from these 2 regions, there were no other category-
selective responses in the anterior temporal lobes. To
demonstrate the robustness of the person-selective effects to
a different voxel selection strategy (Kreigeskorte et al. 2009),
and to assess whether statistical mapping was even necessary
to observe person-selective responses in this region, we used
an anatomical region of interest approach to examine the
average response across all voxels in the anterior temporal lobe
ROIs for each of the 3 conditions. As can be seen in Figure 2B,
person-fact encoding produced greater activation than either
building- or hammer-fact encoding across the entirety of the
left and right anterior temporal lobes, but no differences were
observed between buildings and hammers (left anterior
temporal: person > building, t(11) = 1.95, one-tailed P = 0.04;
person > hammer, t(11) = 2.27, one-tailed P = 0.02; building
versus hammer, t(11) = 0.65, 2-tailed P = 0.53; right anterior
temporal: person > building, t(11) = 2.10, one-tailed P = 0.03;
person > hammer, t(11) = 2.75, one-tailed P = 0.01; building
versus hammer, t(11) = 1.14, 2-tailed P = 0.29).
No domain-general responses were observed anywhere in the
anterior temporal lobes. In other words, there were no regions
in the anterior temporal lobes where activity was equivalent for
person, building, and hammer fact learning and where these 3
conditions produced reliably greater activation than the Riser
Detection Task, our nonsemantic control condition.
Fact Encoding Effects Outside the Anterior Temporal
Lobes
Although the current experiment’s focus is the function of the
anterior temporal lobes, domain-speciﬁc and domain-general
responses were observed in other brain regions (Fig. 3).
Domain-Speciﬁc Encoding Effects
Outside the anterior temporal lobes, person-selective encoding
effects were observed in regions commonly implicated in
social processing, including the medial PFC, precuneus and
posterior cingulate, and the right pSTS. In addition, the
superior parietal lobule was also activated bilaterally, as was
the left insula (see Table 3). Contrary to our prediction, place-
selective effects were not observed in the parahippocampal
gyrus. Instead, large areas of place-selective activity were
observed bilaterally in the lingual, cuneus, and middle occipital
gyri, as well as the right cerebellum. Finally, as predicted,
hammer-selective activity was observed in the left posterior
middle temporal gyrus.
Domain-General Encoding Effects
Although domain-general encoding effects were not observed
in the anterior temporal lobes, other brain regions did exhibit
these effects (see Table 3). For example, a large area of domain-
general activation was observed to stretch from the left inferior
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domain-general activation was observed in the left hippocam-
pus, the left middle temporal gyrus, left angular gyrus, and the
right cerebellum.
Functional Connectivity: Anterior Temporal Person-
Selective Regions are Part of the Wider Social Cognitive
Network
Further support for the person-selective nature of the anterior
temporal lobes comes from functional connectivity analyses
using independent data sets. We used the Vigilance Task
scanning runs to examine the functional connectivity with the
peak activations in the left and right anterior temporal person-
selective clusters identiﬁed in the Fact-Learning Task. The left
anterior temporal person-selective cluster was functionally
connected with brain regions frequently implicated in social
cognition, including the medial PFC, the pSTS, the amygdala,
and the precuneus/posterior cingulate bilaterally, and in the
left lateral portion of the fusiform gyrus (Fig. 4). In addition to
the other social-processing regions, activity in the left anterior
temporal person-selective cluster was tightly coupled with
activity in the corresponding region in the right anterior
temporal lobe. Finally, activity in the left anterior temporal
person-selective region was correlated with activity in regions
known to support more general information processing,
including the left inferior frontal gyrus and the left
Table 2
Anterior temporal lobe activations
Contrast Side/location Coordinates Volume (mm
3)
xY z
Person-selective clusters
L superior temporal gyrus 47 17 22 848
R superior temporal gyrus 47 17 26 800
Domain-general clusters
None
Note: Coordinates are listed in Talairach space. We do not report peak t-scores in the table
because the reported clusters reﬂect conjunctions of statistical contrast maps for which the
constituent peak t-values might be located in different voxels. The reported coordinates are the
locations of each cluster’s peak average t-value for person [ building and person [ hammer.
Reporting the t-statistic associated with this average t score would be misleading, as this value
would underestimate the true differences between the 2 conditions, even though it would itself
clear the threshold for statistical signiﬁcance. See Supplemental Table 3 for the locations and
peak t-scores for the individual contrasts contributing to this conjunction analysis.
Figure 2. Person-selective responses in the anterior temporal lobes. (A) person-selective clusters in the anterior temporal lobes identiﬁed using conjunction analyses. The
rendered surfaces show the person-selective clusters in the left and right hemispheres where person[building AND person[hammer with P\0.05 and cluster-size corrected
for the volume of the anterior temporal lobes. (B) Activity in the anterior temporal lobe ROIs. The rendered surfaces show the extent of the anterior temporal ROIs in the left and
right hemispheres. The bar graphs demonstrate the average percent signal change across subjects in the left and right anterior temporal ROIs relative to the nonconceptual (riser
detection) control task. In both ROIs, the responses to person-fact encoding were reliably greater than the responses to building- or hammer-fact encoding. Responses during
building- and hammer-fact encoding were not different from each other. Error bars on bar charts in both panels indicate ±1 standard error of the subject means.
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regions functionally connected with the left anterior temporal
seed voxel). As with the left hemisphere, activity in the right
anterior temporal person-selective cluster was correlated with
activity in regions previously implicated in social processing,
including the medial PFC bilaterally, the amygdala bilaterally,
the left posterior cingulate/precuneus, the left fusiform gyrus,
and the left anterior temporal lobe (Fig. 4). In addition, this
region was functionally connected with a host of more general
information processing areas, including the left inferior frontal
gyrus, the left perirhinal cortex, and the superior frontal gyrus
bilaterally (see Supplemental Table 2 for complete list).
Discussion
Person-Selectivity in the Anterior Temporal Lobes
In the present study the anterior temporal lobes exhibited
strong category-selectivity while subjects learned facts about
people, relative to building- and hammer facts. The person-
selective responses in the conjunction analyses were observed
in nearly identical anterolateral regions of the superior
temporal gyri and temporal poles in the 2 hemispheres.
Domain-general effects were not observed in the anterior
temporal lobes, although they were found in other brain
regions, including the hippocampus and left inferior frontal
gyrus. The absence of domain-general anterior temporal effects
in our data cannot be due to poor signal quality because we
observed statistically reliable clusters of activity in the lateral
anterior temporal cortex, the anterior temporal region with the
highest temporalsignal-to-noiseratiosinthepresent data(Fig.1),
and the area predicted to be the domain-general semantic hub
based on pathology in semantic dementia (Mummery et al. 2000;
Levy et al. 2004; Moss et al. 2005).
Eschewing cluster mapping altogether, we evaluated sepa-
rately for each hemisphere the average response of the entire
temporal lobes anterior to the limen insula. Even when using
Figure 3. Domain-speciﬁc and domain-general responses outside the anterior temporal lobes indentiﬁed using conjunction analyses. Domain-general responses (shown in gold)
were observed in various regions outside the anterior temporal lobes, including the left inferior and superior frontal gyri, the left middle temporal gyrus, and the hippocampus. A
hammer-selective cluster (shown in blue) was observed in the left middle temporal gyrus (L pMTG) immediately posterior to a domain-general cluster. More medially, building-
selective clusters (shown in green) were observed in left and right middle occipital gyri. Person-selective clusters (shown in red) were observed along the midline in the medial
PFC and the precuneus, among other regions. All clusters are corrected for multiple comparisons.
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lobes responded selectively when encoding information about
people. In both hemispheres, the response proﬁle was highly
person-speciﬁc, with little difference in the responses to
buildings and hammers.
The conjunction analysis was an extremely conservative
measure requiring signiﬁcantly greater activity for the person-
fact learning than building-fact learning and greater activity for
the person-fact learning than hammer-fact learning. Addition-
ally, each of these tests independently had to reach signiﬁcance
after correction for multiple comparisons. The fact that we
replicated the person-fact selectivity in the ROI analysis,
which aggregated activity across the entire anterior temporal
lobe, demonstrates the robustness of this effect. Including all
the voxels in the anterior temporal lobe did not wash out the
statistically reliable categorical effects observed in the con-
junction analysis.
The ﬁndings of the cluster-mapping and anatomical-ROI
analyses were further strengthened by the functional connec-
tivity proﬁles of the anterior temporal lobes, with the present
study being the ﬁrst to describe the functional connectivity of
this region. The anterior temporal person-selective clusters,
identiﬁed in the Fact-Learning Task scans, were found to be
functionally connected with virtually the entire social cognition
network, as measured during the independent Vigilance-Task
scan. The functional connectivity ﬁndings reported here agree
with tracer studies in the macaque, where strong anatomical
connectivity is observed between the temporal pole and the
amygdala, superior temporal gyrus, area TE (potential monkey
homologue of human fusiform gyrus), and the medial frontal
cortex (Moran et al. 1987; Kondo et al. 2003).
Given the results of the conjunction analyses, the anterior
temporal ROI analyses, and the functional connectivity analyses
on independent data, we can be conﬁdent that the person-
selectivity observed in the anterior temporal lobes was not
a product of the particular statistical-mapping procedure, or
the particular task, or the particular stimuli presented to
subjects, or even the particular seed voxel within the anterior
temporal lobe. Rather the results appear to reﬂect this region’s
underlying function and connectivity within a network sup-
porting social cognition.
Social Conceptual Processing in the Anterior Temporal
Lobes
Recently, Zahn et al. (2007) reported activation of the anterior
superior temporal gyrus when subjects made meaning-re-
latedness judgments for social concepts. In the present study,
the person-speciﬁc effects in the anterior temporal lobe
stretched from the middle temporal gyrus up into the superior
temporal gyrus. Given the differences in the paradigms and
stimuli, it is remarkable how much agreement exists between
our ﬁndings, and those reported by Zahn et al. (2007).
Zahn and colleagues observed a reliable difference between
social and animal concepts in the superior temporal gyrus, with
much weaker effects of each condition versus ﬁxation in the
middle temporal gyrus. They speculate that there may exist an
inferior--superior gradient for multisensory versus abstract
person-speciﬁc knowledge, with the former located in middle
temporal gyrus, and the latter located in the superior temporal
gyrus. Although this is one explanation for these ﬁndings, it is
not the only explanation. Alternatively, it could be that the
anterior temporal lobes are relatively more responsive to
animate than inanimate entities, with the superior temporal
gyrus being particularly responsive for human-animate attrib-
utes (such as the social abstract concepts used by Zahn et al.).
By this account, we observed more inferior middle temporal
activity, in addition to the superior temporal activity, because
we compared animate to inanimate entities (e.g., people vs.
buildings and hammers). This account also ﬁnds support in the
both our ROI analyses using the entirety of the anterior
temporal lobes, and in the functional connectivity ﬁndings,
which showed correlated spontaneous ﬂuctuations between
our anterior temporal lobe person-selective regions and the
wider social/animacy network.
Yet another possibility is that in Zahn and colleagues’ data
the signal quality might be poorer in middle temporal gyrus
than in superior temporal gyrus. Zahn and colleagues only
observed middle temporal activity in statistical comparisons
that presumably have much higher contrast-to-noise ratios,
namely the social and animal concepts versus a simple ﬁxation
baseline. Note, however, that this contrast does not control for
many nonconceptual differences between the task performed
by subjects (e.g., reading words and making meaning-related-
ness judgments) and the ﬁxation baseline condition. By this
account, we may have observed more inferior effects, in
addition to the superior temporal effects, because of better
signal quality over this region (e.g., see Fig. 1 and refer to
Imaging Details section).
Although we are not certain which of the above-described
explanations account for the differences between our ﬁndings
and those reported by Zahn and colleagues, we strongly believe
that the overall ﬁndings of the 2 studies exhibit signiﬁcant
agreement and are mutually supportive.
Table 3
Domain-speciﬁc and domain-general activations outside the anterior temporal lobes
Contrast (mm
3) Side/location Coordinates Volume
xyz
Person
Midline medial PFC 1 59 16 4896
Midline post. cingulate/precuneus 5 51 26 3224
L superior parietal lobule 19 51 58 952
R posterior STS 47 59 12 872
L inferior frontal operculum 51 5 12 552
L superior frontal gyrus 7 49 32 336
L insula -43 19 16 224
R superior parietal lobule 25 41 60 200
Building
L lingual/middle occipital gyrus 9 81 2 4112
R lingual/middle occipital gyrus 11 81 4 4032
R cerebellum 11 71 16 552
Hammer
L middle temporal gyrus 51 55 0 576
Domain-general
L superior/inferior frontal gyrus 23 17 52 10488
L middle temporal gyrus 53 31 2 3648
R cerebellum 35 65 40 1456
L parahipp. gyrus/hippocampus 35 29 10 1400
L angular gyrus 41 57 28 968
Note: Coordinates are listed in Talairach space. We do not report peak t-scores in the table
because the reported clusters reﬂect conjunctions of statistical contrast maps for which the
constituent peak t-values might be located in different voxels. The reported coordinates are the
locations of each cluster’s peak average t-value for the contrast maps contributing to the
conjunction analysis. Reporting the t-statistic associated with this average t-score would be
misleading, as this value would underestimate the true differences between the 2 conditions,
even though it would itself clear the threshold for statistical signiﬁcance. See Supplemental
Tables 4--7 for the locations and peak t-scores for the individual contrasts contributing to these
conjunction analyses.
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Not Simply Reﬂect Encoding Effort
Given that subjects generally remembered more person facts
than building or hammer facts, one might argue that the person
selectivity in the anterior temporal lobes simply reﬂects
encoding effort. There are at least 5 arguments against this
account. First, not all brain regions responded selectively for
person-fact encoding. Indeed, as just described, many regions
responded selectively to other categories. This suggests that
there was not a general encoding effort effect for the person
facts. Second, regions such as the left inferior frontal gyrus and
the hippocampus that would be expected to show a task
difﬁculty or encoding effort effect do not exhibit selectivity for
person-fact encoding, but rather responded in a domain-
general fashion (e.g., responded equally to all categories).
Third, given that we have much more experience learning new
information about people, relative to buildings and hammers, it
seems unlikely that one would ﬁnd more activation for learning
person facts relative to the other categories if the activity in
this region is driven by encoding effort. Fourth, better person
fact recall (vs. building fact recall) or recognition (vs. hammer
fact recognition) does not guarantee differences between
Figure 4. The person-selective clusters in the anterior temporal lobes are functionally connected with the wider social cognition network. Color overlays indicate clusters of
functional connectivity with the anterior temporal seed voxels measured in the independent Vigilance Task scanning run. The left and right anterior temporal seed voxels were
identiﬁed as those voxels in each hemisphere with the highest average t-value for the person[building and person[hammer t-maps in the Fact-Learning Task scanning runs.
The depicted functional connectivity t-maps were obtained as follows. First, for each subject a Pearson correlation map was constructed showing correlation between each voxel
and an anterior temporal seed voxel. Second, these r-maps were converted to Z score maps. Finally, these Z-maps were included in a random effects, one-sample t-test to
identify voxels whose means differed from zero with P \ 0.0005 and cluster-size corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain at P \ 0.05.
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could be entirely mediated by storage or retrieval processes.
Finally, and perhaps most convincingly, using independent,
non-task-related data we observed functional connectivity
between the person-selective clusters in the anterior temporal
lobes and the wider social cognition network, a ﬁnding that
strongly supports our interpretation that the activation
observed in this area reﬂects its role in social cognition, not
encoding effort.
Domain-Speciﬁcity Outside the Anterior Temporal Lobes
Outside the anterior temporal lobes, we observed other
domain-speciﬁc effects. Encoding hammer facts selectively
engaged a posterior region of the left middle temporal gyrus.
This ﬁnding was predicted a priori, given that the region is
consistently activated during conceptual processing of tool
categories and tool-related verbs using both pictorial and
linguistic stimuli (e.g., Beauchamp et al. 2002; Kemmerer et al.
2008; for recent reviews see Thompson-Schill 2003; Beau-
champ and Martin 2007; Martin and Simmons 2008). Large
place-selective responses occurred bilaterally in the cuneus
and up into middle occipital gyrus. This region, near the
transverse occipital sulcus, has been previously implicated in
scene perception, navigation, and the representation of large-
scale features (such as buildings) in the visual environment
(Levy, Hasson et al. 2004; Epstein et al. 2007; MacEvoy and
Epstein 2007). Finally, in addition to the anterior temporal
lobes, learning facts about people elicited category-selective
responses in other social cognition regions. Person-selective
responses were observed in the medial PFC, a region that
supports mentalizing about others’ mental states (Amodio and
Frith 2006; Frith 2007); the right pSTS, a region commonly
implicated in the perception and conceptualization of bi-
ological motion (Beauchamp et al. 2002, 2003); and the
precuneus, a region implicated in social perspective-taking
and representation of the self (Cavanna and Trimble 2006).
Domain-General Responses
We found no evidence for a domain-general hub in the anterior
temporal lobes. This does not mean however that hub theories
in general are incorrect. Rather, it only means that if a domain-
general representational hub exists in the brain, it is not in the
anterior temporal lobes. In fact, we did ﬁnd domain-general
areas. One region was a large area in left frontal cortex
stretching from the inferior frontal gyrus up to the middle
frontal gyrus. Based on ﬁndings from earlier research, this
region serves as a control-center for conceptual processing,
guiding retrieval and postretrieval selection of property
information stored in posterior cortex, irrespective of category
(Bookheimer 2002; Thompson-Schill 2003; Badre and Wagner
2007). Similarly, domain-general responses were observed in
the hippocampus, a region long known to support the
acquisition of new knowledge (Squire and Zola 1998). It is
unlikely that either of these regions serve as representational
hubs in the sense previously attributed to the anterior temporal
lobes. For example, although damage to the left inferior frontal
gyrus results in word-ﬁnding deﬁcits, it does not disrupt
conceptual knowledge per se (Baldo and Shimamura 1998;
Thompson-Schill et al. 1998; Price et al. 1999). Similarly,
although damage to the hippocampus greatly affects new
learning, it does not result in conceptual deﬁcits for previously
acquired knowledge (Levy et al. 2004).
We also observed domain-general responses in the left
middle temporal gyrus (immediately anterior to the domain-
speciﬁc ‘‘hammer’’ cluster), the left angular gyrus, and the right
cerebellum, all regions shown previously to be engaged when
subjects learn new facts and associations (Maguire and Frith
2004; Addis and McAndews 2006). Of these regions, the left
middle temporal gyrus may be of particular interest in future
studies, as it is often implicated in domain-general conceptual
processing (Hickok and Poeppel 2007; Lau et al., 2008).
Conceptual Processing during the Fact-Learning Task
Semantic memory/conceptual processing involves retrieving
information about objects and words that is not immediately
available in a stimulus itself. This is perhaps most easily
recognized in the case of conceptual processing for words,
where the word itself is merely an arbitrary symbol, and so
understanding its meaning necessarily requires attributions and
inferences about the word’s referent. A bedrock principle in
cognitive psychology is that reading words automatically
activates word meaning (e.g., consider the ubiquity of Stroop
effects). Thus, reading the sentence stimuli in our task engaged
our subjects’ conceptual systems. Given this, we simply needed
to ensure that they actually read the sentence stimuli. To
accomplish this we told subjects to remember the information
they learned because their memory would be tested at the end
of the study.
Our task allowed us to directly compare 3 familiar categories
for which subjects had a great deal of previously acquired
conceptual knowledge, while being reasonably certain that
subjects processed the categories at the same level of
speciﬁcity and with the same amount of knowledge about
the speciﬁc exemplars presented in the scanner. Although the
speciﬁc exemplars were unfamiliar, subjects’ comprehension of
the sentence stimuli meant that the task engaged retrieval of
pre-existing category-knowledge. Good evidence for this
comes from the neuroanatomical distribution of the activations
we observed. Consider the person-fact learning condition.
Learning facts about speciﬁc peoples’ occupations, ages, and
places of birth activated regions previously demonstrated to
represent biological motion (posterior STS; Beauchamp et al.
2002, 2003), mentalizing about other’s mental states (medial
PFC; Amodio and Frith 2006; Frith 2007), and social perspec-
tive-taking and representation of the self (precuneus; Cavanna
and Trimble 2006). The facts learned by subjects about
a particular person did not contain references to that person’s
physical motions, their mental states, or social interactions, and
thus these activations are neural signatures of conceptual
inferences about the exemplars. Similarly, the hammer facts
never described the hammers in motion, yet we can deduce
that subjects were engaged in conceptual inference about the
hammer exemplars because we observed activation in a region
of the middle temporal gyrus known to represent nonbiological
(tool) motion (Beauchamp et al. 2002). These activations
further strengthen our conﬁdence that the fact-learning task
was successful at engendering conceptual processing, and
warrants our claims about the anterior temporal lobe’s role in
conceptual processing.
Because all 3 conditions required fact learning, comparisons
among the categories should cancel-out domain-general
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processes. Now, in light of this, consider the claims of the
domain-general semantic hub account, which asserts that the
anterior temporal lobes are the domain-general hub of the
human conceptual system irrespective of the task context
through which conceptual information is accessed. In fact, hub
models explicitly claim that the anterior temporal semantic
hub is engaged in any and all varieties of conceptual processing
tasks (e.g., see Patterson et al. 2007). If this is correct, then we
should have observed greater anterior temporal lobe activation
for all categories compared to the nonsemantic control task,
and equivalent activations for all categories in our task. We did
not. This leaves us with only 2 options. The ﬁrst option is that
the anterior temporal lobes are domain-speciﬁc for person
knowledge during sentence comprehension, but the same
tissue is domain-general in other task contexts (perhaps after
consolidation from the hippocampus to the neocortex), and
also exhibiting strong functional connectivity with the wider
social cognition network. The second option is that the
anterior temporal lobes are domain-speciﬁc for person
knowledge regardless of the conceptual processing context,
and also strongly functionally connected to the wider social
cognition circuit. Option one assumes a remarkable switch in
domain selectivity from one task context to another, and we
can think of no evidence for such a switch either in the
anterior temporal lobe or indeed anywhere else in the brain.
Option 2 is also a more parsimonious account.
Conclusion
Rather than serving as a domain-general conceptual hub, the
anterior temporal lobes appear to support person knowledge.
Using both typical statistical-mapping approaches, as well as
gross anatomical-ROI analyses, we observed person-selectivity
in both the left and right anterior temporal lobes. Further, in
independent data sets these regions were functionally con-
nected with the social cognition network. Future studies
should seek to better understand the information content
within the anterior temporal lobes. In this regard, it is
important to note that there exists both neuropsychological
and neuroimaging evidence that this regions plays a critical role
in the representation of unique entities (Nakamura et al. 2000;
Grabowski et al. 2001; Damasio et al. 2004; Tranel 2006). The
present study compared responses among different categories
of unique entities, rather than between unique and nonunique
entities. As such, it will be important for future studies to clarify
the relationship between the unique entity ﬁndings, and the
results reported here.
More generally, the ﬁndings reported here help to clarify the
architecture of the human conceptual system. As demonstrated
in many earlier studies, conceptual knowledge is supported by
a widely distributed network of property regions that represent
in part the content of conceptual representations, as well as
auxiliary regions such as the hippocampus and left inferior
frontal gyrus that support memory acquisition and retrieval
processes generally. The precise architecture of this system,
namely the nodes through which regions are functionally
connected, remains an important and controversial question.
In the present study, no evidence was obtained in support of
the claim that the anterior temporal lobe is a domain-general
representational hub. Rather, the ﬁndings strongly suggest
that the anterior temporal lobe is a component in a network
supporting an important class of knowledge: social concepts
(Zahn et al. 2007). Describing how the components of this and
other conceptual processing networks connect and communi-
cate is a major challenge for all neural theories of the human
conceptual system. Developing a better understanding of both
the functional and structural connectivity among these regions,
and how these connections develop over the lifespan and
change with experience, remains a critical and unﬁnished task.
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